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Bakke's Wake*

By Philip B. Kurland
Some years ago now, James Joyce
published a novel-I think it can
be called a novel-titled Finnegans
Wake. When I tried to read it, I found
it recondite, cryptic, enigmatic, and
obscure. Some time thereafter, a book
titled The Skeleton Key to Finnegans
Wake was published. But even with
that guide, FinnegansWake remained
as arcane as ever for me. Probably
what I need is a Cipher to the Skeleton Key to Finnegans Wake.
While, unlike with FinnegansWake,
I understand almost every word
of the Bakke opinions in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 98
S. Ct. 2733 (1978), the meaning as a
whole of these judicial efforts remains
recondite, cryptic, enigmatic, and obscure. Of course, unlike the Joyce
product, which is-I am told-a great
work of art, the Bakke judgments are
-I am told-at best minor works
of judicial statesmanship, sometimes
called politics. And unlike with the
novel, no one has yet ventured to
offer a skeleton key to Bakke. Nor
do I.
It may well be that either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is truly the skeleton key
to the different Bakke opinions; at
*This article is adapted from a talk delivered in the Distinguished Speaker Program
of DePaul University College of Law on
August 1, 1978, and before the Legal Club
of Chicago on September 18, 1978.

least these are represented by the
Justices to be their guides. Or it may
be that most of the opinions are
merely expositions of the personal
predilections of each of the authors,
having nothing to do with the intent
or function of either Constitution or
congressional legislation.
Before I venture further into the
subject, however, allow me to reveal
my bias so that you may discount it
as you consider what I say. With
others, I filed a brief amicus curiae
in the Bakke case on behalf of the
Anti-Defamation League. In that brief
we asserted that the questions presented to the Court by the case were
two:
May a State consistently with
the commands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, exclude an applicant
from one of its medical schools
solely on the ground of the applicant's race?
May a State consistently with
the commands of the national
Civil Rights Acts, exclude an applicant from one of its medical
schools solely on the ground of
the applicant's race?
The relevant provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment read: "No State
shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws" (emphasis added). The
Chicago Bar Record
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Civil Rights Act provision to which
we had reference was Title VI of the
1964 statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which
provides:
No person in the United States
shall, on the groundof race, color,
or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. (Emphasis added.)
We also made reference to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which derives from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. We offered this
not so much as a ground for relief,
because it was not a part of the applicant's complaint in the California
courts, but rather as a more particularized statement of the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Section
1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other. (Emphasis added.)
In sum, this direct antecedent to the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that
the black citizens of our nation are
entitled to those rights available to

white citizens and should not be subjected to greater "punishment, pains,
[and] penalties" than white citizens.
The facts, as we saw them, were
not complicated. "It only need be
said that sixteen places in Petitioner's
entering class at the medical school at
Davis were closed to [Bakke] and all
other white applicants because of
their race." We thought the question
a narrow one: "The sole question for
adjudication . . . is whether such exclusionary action by the State of California on the ground of Respondent's
race is invalid under the Constitution
and laws of the United States?"
We pointed out that certain issues
cognate to those in the case should
not be the Court's concern in resolving Bakke:
This is not a case concerned
with framing a remedy to right a
constitutional wrong. ...
The question in this case is
also not whether the University of
California is restricted in its admissions standards to such matters as the applicants' Medical
College Admissions Test and college record. Nor does the case test
the validity of these criteria as
measures of potential achievement in medical school or medical
practice....
Nor is the question in this case
whether the national government
may, under certain circumstances,
constitutionally indulge, or compel states to indulge, racial classifications pursuant to Congress's
constitutional powers, whether
under Article I, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment ....
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This case does not raise the
question whether a national or
state legislature can, by majority
action of the relevant legislature,
purport to waive the constitutional rights of whites to equal
protection of the laws ...
Finally, the question in this case
is not whether a large number of
medical and law associations and
other special interest groups think
the departure from the principles
of the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause is desirable ...
Our primary argument was one that
derived from our earlier brief in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), which was recaptured by the
late Professor Alexander M. Bickel in
his posthumously published book, The
Morality of Consent. He wrote:

whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal
than others. Having found support for equality, they now claim
support for inequality under the
same Constitution. Yet a racial
quota derogates the human dignity and individuality of all to
whom it is applied; it is invidious
in principle as well as in practice.
Moreover, it can as easily be
turned against those whom it purports to help. The history of the
racial quota is a history of subjugation, not beneficence. Its evil
lies not in its name but in its
effect; a quota is a divider of
society, a creator of castes, and it
is all the worse for its racial base,
especially in a society desperately
striving for an equality that will
make race irrelevant.

If the Constitution prohibits
exclusion of blacks and other minorities on racial grounds, it cannot permit the exclusion of whites
on similar grounds; for it must be
the exclusion on racial grounds
which offends the Constitution,
and not the particular skin color
of the person excluded.
The lessons of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at
least a generation: discrimination
on the basis of race is illegal,
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
democratic society. Now this is to
be unlearned and we are told that
this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of
whose ox is gored. Those for

Indeed, it may be added, not until
racial categories are obliterated from
our laws can there be even a hope
for the realization of equality in our
society.
Perhaps because the Thirteenth
Amendment was not in issue, we did
not make reference, as we might have
done, to the quotation from Mr. Justice Bradley in The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883), which reads:
"When a man has emerged from
slavery . . . there must be some stage
in the progress of his elevation when
he takes the rank of a mere citizen,
and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws, and when his rights as
a ... man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men's
rights are protected." Our reliance,
instead, was principally on Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which
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held that exclusion of an applicant
from a university on grounds of color
was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; on McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976), which held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 protected whites as
well as racial minorities from discriminatory treatment; on Lucas v. FortyFourth General Assembly of Colorado,
377 U.S. 713, 738 n.31 (1964), which
held that "disparities from populationbased senatorial representation" could
not be justified on grounds that they
"were necessary in order to protect
'insular minorities' and to accord recognition to the 'state's heterogeneous
characteristics' "; and on Mr.. Justice
Douglas's opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342-44 (1974),
where he wrote:
The Equal Protection Clause
commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in
order to satisfy our theory as to

how society ought to be organized....
If discrimination based on race
is constitutionally permissible
when those who hold the reins
can come up with "compelling"
reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike quality. . . . It may
well be that racial strains, racial
susceptibility to certain diseases,
racial sensitiveness to environmental conditions that other races
do not experience, may in an extreme situation justify differences
in racial treatment that no fairminded person would call "invidious" discrimination. Mental ability is not in that category. All
races can compete fairly at all
professional levels. So far as race
is concerned, any state-sponsored
preference to one race over another in that competition is in my
view "invidious" and violative of
the Equal Protection Clause.
Chicago Bar Record
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We argued, too, that racial quota
preferences for blacks were, indeed,
invidious in some of their effects on
blacks. Professor Thomas Sowell,
who is black and can, therefore, say
things that would be deemed hypocritical coming from whites, has
written frequently on this point. In
1972, he wrote in his book Black Education, Myths and Tragedies:
What all the arguments and campaigns for quota are really saying,
loud and clear, is that black people just don't have it, and that
they will have to be given something in order to have something.
The devastating impact of this
message on black people-particularly black young peoplewill outweigh any few extra jobs
that may result from this strategy.
Those black people who are already competent, and who could
be instrumental in producing
more competence among the rising generation, will be completely
undermined, as black becomes
synonymous-in the minds of
black and white alike-with incompetence, and black achievement becomes synonymous with
charity or pay offs.
This attitude is shared by many
blacks. It was not, however, offered for
the proposition that black quotas do
more harm than good, but as a recognition that quotas can and do have
stigmatic effects on those that they
purport to benefit no less than on
those they condemn.
Finally, if the blacks do not regard
the quota system as adverse to their
interests, there are large numbers who

are denominated members of the majority who do resent the shift to them
of the badges of slavery, not the badges
of slaves but those of slave masters:
to be turned out of school places and
jobs on the grounds that they were
responsible-or their ancestors were
responsible and passed on the liability
to them-for the slavery that was and
is the cause of what has been appropriately called the "American dilemma." And so we quoted in our
brief from Professor Nathan Glazer's
book Affirmative Discrimination:
The gravest political consequence is undoubtedly the increasing resentment and hostility
between groups that is fueled by
special benefits for some. The statistical basis for redress makes
one great error: All "whites" are
consigned to the same category
deserving of no special consideration. That is not the way
"whites" see themselves, or indeed are, in social reality. Some
may be "whites" pure and simple.
But almost all have some specific
ethnic or religious identification,
which, to the individual involved,
may mean a distinctive history
of past-and perhaps some present-discrimination. We have
analyzed the position and attitudes of the ethnic groups
formed from the post-1880 immigrants from Europe. These
groups were not particularly involved in the enslavement of the
Negro or the creation of the Jim
Crow pattern in the South, the
conquest of part of Mexico, or the
near-extermination of the American Indian. Indeed, they settled
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in parts of the country where
there were few blacks and almost
no Mexican Americans and
American Indians. They came to
a country which provided them
with less benefits than it now
provides the protected groups.
There is little reason for them to
feel they should bear the burden
of redress of a past in which they
had no or little part, or to assist
those who presently receive more
assistance than they did. We are
indeed a nation of minorities; to
enshrine some minorities as deserving of special benefits means
not to defend minority rights
against a discriminating majority
but to favor some of these minorities over others.
It will be readily seen that a Supreme Court brief addresses a wide
variety of measures. For if the Supreme Court is a court of law, it is
not only a court of law. It is engaged
not merely in resolving a dispute
between the parties but in framing
national policies on a wide variety of
social and economic issues. I am not
saying that the latter is a legitimate
function of the Court. But one would
have to be terribly naive not to recognize that what was once called
"social engineering" has, since 1954
if not before, become the Court's primary role, particularly since Congress
has abdicated its authority and the
bureaucracy-usually an ally of the
judiciary-has come to dominate
policymaking in the executive branch.
So when one addresses an argument
to the Court it is appropriate to
justify an adversary position on the
basis of the original meaning and

intention of the constitutional or statutory provision involved; to consider the gloss on the Constitution
or statute provided by judicial precedents; to point out the political and
economic and social consequences of
a decision one way or another; and,
more subtly, to appeal to the idiosyncratic wishes of each of the Justices.
Nevertheless, it must be accepted
that the briefs and arguments of the
lawyers in a Supreme Court case
ordinarily have only a peripheral effect on the outcome. They tend, at
best, to provide rationalizations for
the conclusions that the Justices have
reached before the briefs are read,
thus affecting later cases in lower
courts far more than the Supreme
Court case itself. Judge Learned
Hand was wont to advise neophytes
that lawyers seldom win cases at the
appellate level, although they frequently lose them. He advised further that more cases are lost by counsel talking too much than by counsel
talking too little.
Whether the Bakke case was one of
the very few cases in which the briefs
and arguments affected the judgment,
we shall never know. There certainly
were enough briefs for each of the
Justices to find something he liked in
at least one of them, although most
of the briefs merely showed on which
side of the controversy a given judicial constituency was to be found.
But the outcome of the case does reveal that the essentially schizophrenic
nature of the adversary system preceded, if it did not cause, an essentially schizophrenic judgment by the
Court. Perhaps it is Solomonic wisdom to recommend splitting the baby
in half as a means to a just result. It
Chicago Bar Record
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is something less than Solomonic wisdom actually to bisect the infant, as
the Court appears to have done in
Bakke.
II
The judgment of the Court was announced by Mr. Justice Powell. His
opinion spoke only for himself, however, except as to Part I, which was
a statement of the facts, and Part
V-C, which was a single paragraph
that reads:
In enjoining petitioner from
ever considering the race of an
applicant, however, the courts
below failed to recognize that
the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race
and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California
court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of
the race of any applicant must
be reversed.
The meaning of the determinative
phrase "competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin" is somewhat
less than pellucid.
There were two conflicting opinions,
each of which garnered the votes of
four Justices, one attributed to the
joint pens of Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun. (It reads to
me, however, as if Mr. Justice Brennan was the principal author.) The
other was written by Mr. Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Burger,
Stewart, and Rehnquist. (Perhaps it
should be noted that the allegedly

monolithic bloc of Nixon appointees
was split one and one-half to two and
one-half, with Mr. Justice Powell affording the swing vote for both judgments.) Thus, of the 154 pages of
opinions, only the nine pages of statement of facts and the one quoted
paragraph are entitled to precedential
effect.
The division of the Court was accomplished by finding two judgments
by the California courts where it had
generally been believed that only one
existed. A majority of the Court found
that the issue made by the facts of
the case-i.e., whether Bakke was the
victim of invalid racial discrimination
by his exclusion from consideration
for any of the sixteen places set aside
for minority applicants-must be resolved in his favor. It found further,
however, that the trial court order
which forbade totally the use of race
as a criterion in the admissions process should be reversed, because race
was not a forbidden classification but
only a highly suspect one.
III
The Brennan group sought to capture the judgment by characterizing
its meaning. "Government may take
race into account when it acts not to
demean or insult any racial group,
but to remedy disadvantages cast on
minorities by past racial prejudice, at
least when appropriate findings have
been made by judicial, legislative, or
administrative bodies with competence to act in this area." This is not
what Mr. Justice Powell said, however, and the Stevens opinion clearly
rejected this reading.
Like Powell, the Brennan four
thought that Title VI is to be equated
Chicago Bar Record
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with the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Title VI . . . does not bar preferential treatment of racial minorities as a
means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such
action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment." "Past societal
discrimination" is the novation quietly
inserted as a new predicate for reverse discrimination.
How is this judgment supported?
First, by a demonstration that Title
VI and the Fourteenth Amendment
were both intended to bar discrimination on the basis of race. Whatever
interpretation the Court might give
the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, should also be read into the language of the legislation. Although in
1964, when the statute was enacted,
there was no reason for Congress to
believe that the Constitution tolerated
reverse racial discrimination, Congress, the Brennan four asserted, obviously wrote the legislation so that
it would conform to whatever the Supreme Court might later say that the
Constitution meant. In short, the legislature was deemed to have written
open-ended legislation, the meaning
of which was to be filled in, not by
the elected representatives in Congress, but by the Supreme Court and
the bureaucracy.
The Brennan group argued that
HEW had, since the enactment of
Title VI, required reverse discrimination, and Congress surely intended to
delegate its lawmaking powers to expert administrative explication. It is
assumed by both the Brennan four
and HEW that if there has been racial discrimination against minorities
by a governmentally funded institution, it must engage in reverse dis-

crimination; if there has been no racial discrimination by the governmentally financed institution, it may
engage in reverse discrimination.
(Quaere, in light of the finding that
whites have been discriminated
against by the University of California at Davis by the quota system
banned by the Court in this case, must
Davis or may Davis now engage in
racial discrimination on behalf of
whites?)
When it turned to the Constitution
whose meaning is to be read into
Title VI, the Brennan four started
with an unchallengeable proposition
from which it quickly retreated. "The
assertion of human equality is closely
associated with the proposition that
differences in color or creed, birth or
status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons
should be treated. Nonetheless, the
position . . . has never been adopted
by this Court as the proper meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause."
Moreover, if every racial classification was found in the past to be a
"suspect classification" subject to
"strict scrutiny"-two code phrases
that almost invariably led to a finding
of unconstitutionality-it seems that
suddenly "strict scrutiny" is an "inexact term" that requires redefinition
(in light of the result that they should
like to reach in this case?). The Brennan four were sudden converts to the
Court's earlier 5-4 decision in San
Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), from
which Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall had dissented: that access to
education is not a fundamental right.
Nevertheless, if the old formula requiring "strict scrutiny" could not be
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invoked on behalf of Bakke, according to these four Justices, they would
make it clear that a mere test of
reasonableness, which would return
the judgment of the wisdom of legislative action to the legislatures, was
not to be tolerated either.
After a curtsy to the need to avoid
stigmatizing or stereotyping any
group-particularly women; a bow to
the irrelevance of such immutable criteria as race, sex, and legitimacy to
almost any legislative classification;
and even an acknowledgment of the
importance of individual responsibility and merit: "advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or approved by the
State should ideally be based on individual merit or achievement, or at
least on factors within the control of
an individual"-the Brennan opinion
strongly concluded that "even if the
concern for individualism is weighed
by the political process, that weighing
cannot waive the personal rights of
individuals under the Fourteenth
Amendment." For which the opinion,
mirabile dictu, cited Lucas v. FortyFourth General Assembly, supra.
The new standard for measurement
of the validity of a racial classification, for at least the Brennan fourninths of the Court, is summed up
thus:
...because of the significant risk
that racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created
by invidious classifications, it is
inappropriate to inquire only
whether there is any conceivable
basis that must sustain such a
classification. Instead, to justify

such a classification an important
and articulated purpose for its
use must be shown. In addition,
any statute must be stricken that
stigmatizes any group or that
singles out those least well represented in the political process
to bear the brunt of a benign
program. Thus our review under
the Fourteenth Amendment should
be strict-not "'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact," because it is
stigma that causes fatality-but
strict and searching nonetheless.
Then, without facts, the Court
found that the legislative body-the
admissions committee and subcommittee-had ample ground to believe
that there was "minority underrepresentation" due to the "handicap of
past discrimination." The Brennan
four would, therefore, have sustained
the Davis quota admissions program,
but on this point they were a discrete
minority. The standard of proof is as
mushy as the rest of the opinion:
"Such relief does not require as a
predicate proof that recipients of
preferential advancement have been
individually discriminated against; it
is enough that each recipient is within
a general class of persons likely to
have been the victims of discrimination." When? Where? By whom? All
appear to be irrelevant questions as
the opinion marches on. For it would
seem that not history but statistics
will supply the answer. "Underrepresentation" is itself proof of discrimination, at least so long as the claim of
discrimination does not derive from a
white male or class of white males.
In sum, if you are a member of a
racially identifiable minority (or a
Chicago Bar Record
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female), you can be, by statute or
even without one, entitled to the privilege of a place within any trade, profession, school, or university, without
regard to the relative capacities of
your competition, until such time as
the ratio of the racial minority approximates its ratio to the population
at large or in the pool of applicants,
at which time the past discrimination
(which need not be defined) entitles
you only to equality of treatment and
no longer to privilege.
This is apparently the collective
view of the Brennan four.
Individually, Mr. Justice White
wrote an opinion expressing the view
that Title VI does not create any individual right of suit. (The Court has
granted certiorari to determine this
question in the case of a female applicant for admission to the medical
schools of the University of Chicago
and Northwestern University.) Mr.
Justice Marshall wrote an opinion
based on the revisionist history of
slavery, from which emerges a duty
of reverse discrimination at least in
favor of blacks, whatever their individual heritage or condition. Nonblack minorities might find themselves outside the ken of affirmative
action programs under this opinion's
rationalization. Marshall, incidentally,
was of the view that the majority of
the Court, in Bakke, had in fact destroyed the validity of most, if not all,
governmental affirmative action programs-a position of dubious merit.
Mr. Justice Blackmun sounds almost
apologetic for being found where he
was, but he seems to say that the
Constitution may be set aside because
the problem of a short supply of physicians of minority races is there and

the courts should certainly tolerate
any university admissions discrimination that may contribute to an increase in their number.
I shall, shortly, examine the degree
to which the Brennan four position is
supported by the Powell opinion, but
first a look at the position of the other
bloc of four Justices as gathered in
Mr. Justice Stevens's opinion.

IV
While the Brennan group and Mr.
Justice Powell each took fifty-five
pages to state their positions, the Stevens opinion was only fourteen pages
-and most of these were covered
with footnotes. The opinion was short
because he thought the issues before
the Court to be few and narrow:
"... the question whether race can
ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this
case, and discussion of that issue is
inappropriate." Nor was it necessary
to address any constitutional question, since the case was fully disposed
of by resort to Title VI.
On Mr. Justice Stevens's reading of
the language of Title VI and its legislative history, the meaning was clear
that it protected everyone, white or
black or brown or yellow, from discrimination on the basis of race by
any institution receiving federal
funds. "In unmistakable terms the Act
prohibits the exclusion of individuals
from federally funded programs because of their race. As succinctly
phrased during the Senate debate,
under Title VI it is not 'permissible to
say "yes" to one person, but to say
"no" to another person, only because
of the color of his skin.'
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According to Stevens, the question
of the right of an individual to invoke
Title VI was not properly before the
Court because the petitioner had
never raised the issue before. If the
issue had to be decided, however"To date, the courts, including this
Court, have unanimously concluded
or assumed that a private action may
be maintained under Title VI. The
United States has taken the same
position; . . . Congress has repeatedly
enacted legislation predicated on the
assumption that Title VI may be enforced in a private action. The conclusion ... is amply supported in the
legislative history of Title VI itself."
By way of conclusion, he wrote:
"The University's special admissions
program violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by excluding
Bakke from the medical school because of his race. It is therefore our
duty to affirm the judgment ordering
Bakke admitted to the University."
It was almost as though these four
Justices thought that they were a
court of law and not a continuing
constitutional convention. For they
disposed of a narrow question presented on the facts of the case on the
basis of unambiguous language of a
controlling statute made even clearer
by its legislative history. The opinion
was almost unbecomingly modest and
sound.

V
Mr. Justice Powell refused to pass
on the question whether Title VI
gave rise to individual suits, because
that question had not been contested
below. He was, however, willing to
assume for purposes of the case that

jurisdiction over the Title VI claim
was proper.
He then joined the Brennan four in
the position that Title VI was intended to have the same meaning as
the Constitution, even though this
would result in a new meaning for
the same statutory language every
time the Court amended the Constitution by judicial action, as it has
done so frequently. This conclusion
is strange in light of the fact that the
Court, in the past, has found a clear
distinction, for example, between the
constitutional standard and the statutory standard of Title VII; e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). Be that as it may, there are
now five votes that the language of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act means what
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause means. Powell,
therefore, quickly turned to, and
rested on, a constitutional construction.
Powell seems, however, to give to
the Fourteenth Amendment the same
reading that the Stevens group gave
to Title VI. Thus, Powell wrote:
"[T]he special admissions program is
undeniably a classification based on
race and ethnic background ....
It is
settled beyond question that the
'rights created by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment are, by
its terms, guaranteed to the individual. They are personal rights.' . . .
The guarantee of equal protection
cannot mean one thing when applied
to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the
same protection, then it is not equal."
Powell then rejected the essence of
the Brennan group theory. He said,
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in effect, that there can be no such
thing as a benign racial discrimination, making reference here to the
language I quoted earlier from
Bickel's Morality of Consent. And he
rejected both the notion that there is
a simple white majority and the notion that the sins of the fathers shall
be visited on their children unto the
third and fourth generations. He
wrote:
The concepts of "majority" and
"minority" necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political
judgments. As observed above,
the white "majority" itself is
composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay
claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the
state and private individuals.
Not all these groups can receive
preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of
distinctions drawn in terms of
race and nationality, for then the
only "majority" left would be a
new minority of White AngloSaxon Protestants. There is no
principled basis for deciding
which
groups would merit
"heightened judicial solicitude"
and which would not....
Moreover, there are serious
problems of justice connected
with the idea of preference itself.
First, it may not always be clear
that a so-called preference is in
fact benign. . . . Nothing in the
Constitution supports the notion
that individuals may be asked to
suffer otherwise impermissible
burdens in order to enhance the
societal standing of their ethnic

groups. Second, preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve
success without special protection based on a factor having no
relationship to individual worth.
• . . Third, there is a measure of
inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's position to
bear the burden of redressing
grievances not of their making.
Thus, Powell rejected the notion
that the cases invoking racial classification for purposes of remedying a
particular racial discrimination were
relevant here. For this reason, it
would be inappropriate to read Bakke
as damning all "affirmative action"
programs. Those addressed to a particular remedy for a particular statutory or constitutional violation
would seem to be condonable under
Bakke. It was Powell's conclusion
that the classification undertaken by
the University of California was a
suspect classification and must be
justified where a white was discriminated against in the same terms as
prior decisions had demanded justification where blacks were the victims
of discrimination. This the university
could not do:
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of
its race or ethnic origin, such a
preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as
facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic
Chicago Bar Record
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origin is discrimination for its
own sake. This the Constitution
forbids.
If the university could not afford
benefits to a racial group because
they were a racial group, Powell said,
neither could they justify a goal of
"remedying the effects of 'societal
discrimination,' an amorphous concept
of injury that may be ageless in its
reach into the past." Particular statutory or constitutional violations may
be redressed. But the university could
not make such findings of constitutional or statutory violations. It was
not competent to do so.
Hence, the purpose of helping
certain groups whom the faculty
of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions
program are thought to have
suffered.
The university's argument that it
sought minority students in order to
enhance the medical services that
would be delivered to minority and
deprived patients (a dubious equation) simply was not demonstrated on
the record. "Indeed, petitioner has
not shown that its preferential classification is likely to have any significant effect on the problem."
Powell's opinion then took a strange
and wonderful turn. Pointing out that
the university claimed the right to
select its own student body, Powell
agreed that "[t] he freedom of a uni-

versity to make its own judgments as
to education includes the selection of
its student body." That argument was
likely to prove too much, however, for
if the university's discretion was unlimited, then the concept of academic
freedom would permit exclusion as
well as admission on racial grounds.
Therefore: "Although a university
must have wide discretion in making
the sensitive judgments as to who
should be admitted, constitutional
limitations
protecting
individual
rights may not be disregarded."
Diversity of student population is a
valid state interest. But "[t] he diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special admissions
program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity."
Thus, race is not a totally irrelevant
factor in a university's admissions program. But, said Powell, this proposition is not a means for providing an
evasion of the principles that he had
stated to this point:
It has been suggested that an
admissions program which considers race only as one factor is
simply a subtle and more sophisticated-but no less effectivemeans of according racial preference than the Davis program. A
facial intent to discriminate,
however, is evident in petitioner's
preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial
infirmity exists in an admission
program where race or ethnic
background is simply one ele-
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ment-to be weighed fairly
against other elements-in the
selection process.
It was here that Powell inserted
paragraph V-C, which, with the
Brennan four position, called for the
reversal of the injunction entered by
the district court against any use of
race in the admissions process.
The Powell opinion, therefore, affords little support for the Brennan
position. On the major issue-whether
mere membership in a so-called racial
or ethnic minority constitutionally
justified a privilege or preference by a
state or federal governmental agency
-there was a clear majority of five
in opposition. On the alternate question-whether race can ever be a
factor in conferring a benefit or privilege-there was a clear majority
holding that it may, at least if there
were a constitutionally justifiable reason for it; here the reason was "academic freedom."
V1
The Bakke case was, and is, a victim of what we have come to call, in
the course of our destruction of the
English language, "hype." It was overplayed by the press and various interest groups before judgment as the
most important case that the Court
was called on to decide since Dred
Scott made the Civil War inevitable.
On the day the decision came down,
it was played in the press and over
television like the attack on Pearl
Harbor. Certainly, by now, it should
be realized that the case will have
no broad consequences, except a decided increase in the amount of litigation. It has opened issues rather

than foreclosing them. Nor will it
have the significance of Brown v.
Board of Education, which gave a
new and fundamental shift to the
meaning of our Constitution. For
neither the Powell opinion, announcing the judgment of the Court, nor
Brennan-White-Marshall-Blackthe
mun opinion, nor the Stevens opinion
is in any way authoritative. We are
left, rather, with an opened Pandora's
box, from which nothing has yet
emerged except noises suggesting that
it does indeed contain some frightful
ills. But we should remember that,
with all the ills of mankind that Pandora's box contained, there was also
to be found in it Hope.
The only result certainly to be
brought about will be that university
admissions programs based on fixed
quotas, like those at the University of
California at Davis, will be abandoned. But there weren't very many
of these to begin with. The same results in terms of minority admissions,
however, are likely to be brought
about by indirection. Most universities and their professional schools
now have admissions policies in
which the discretion of the admissions officers is controlling; each decision is an ad hoc one. That discretion includes a consideration of the
university's interest in enhancing the
student enrollment with minority students. That tendency is certainly not
likely to be diminished by the Bakke
judgment.
Indeed, the critical issues in "reverse discrimination" are not really
to be found in the voluntary efforts
of employers or universities to enlarge the proportion of minorities in
employment or classrooms. The priChicago Bar Record

HeinOnline -- 60 Chi. B. Rec. 82 1978-1979

mary difficulties arise from legislative
or constitutional mandates for reverse
discrimination, particularly under
Titles VII and IX of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The principal question
will be what proof shall be required
of the existence of antiminority discrimination as a trigger for remedial
reverse discrimination. And here we
have little to rely on in the Bakke
opinions. An extension of the Stevens
bloc reading of Title VI to the other
titles of the Act would suggest the
need for fairly stringent proof to invoke a racial standard. The Brennan
group would apparently require no
proof of discrimination: sufficient for
them that the person to be preferred
is a member of a racial minority.
Powell's opinion really affords little
guidance, for he would seem to say

that the quantum of proof should be
measured in each case according to
its facts.
It turns out, then, that there really
is no Bakke's Wake. The funereal ceremonial that is a wake is unnecessary
because Bakke is in need of christening and growth rather than burial.
And unlike the wake of a ship,
Bakke leaves no smooth waters immediately behind it, only some flotsam and jetsam that will prove a
danger to future, but different, cases
which are certain to track its course.
Bakke will prove to be a much-cited
case, but rather for the dicta contained
in the various opinions than as a
precedent for anything.
I wonder whether I should reach a
similar conclusion if I were to try to
reread Finnegans Wake.
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